Jeremy S. S. Edwards Bücher

This book provides a critical analysis of widespread claims about the merits of the "bank-based" German system of investment finance. The purpose of the book is to provide an analytical foundation for these claims, and to confront them with empirical evidence from the German economy in the postwar period. The authors show that these claims are not supported by the evidence. This is an important finding, as it reveals that there is no basis for the view that the German system of investment finance is one that should be emulated by other countries.

The debate over corporate governance, or how companies are controlled, has flourished vigorously for several years in the U.S. and has now spread to the U.K. This book collects papers by leading academics, bankers, and consultants which discuss major issues in corporate governance in the U.K., Germany, and Japan. It examines the role of shareholders, company boards, and managers under a market-based system as exists in the U.K. and the U.S. in comparison with the insider system found in Japan and, to a lesser extent, Germany. The issue of the effectiveness of the British system and how it might be made more efficient through increasing the accountability of company boards to shareholders, both directly and via the capital market, is extensively discussed.