Can a human society suffer from illness like a living thing? And if so, how does such a malaise manifest itself? This thought-provoking book masterfully reveals what is at stake in describing societies as 'ill' and why we are drawn to conceive of many social problems as illnesses.
Eine Rekonstruktion von Rousseaus Zweitem Diskurs
The book critically examines Rousseau's insights on the origins of societal inequality and its implications for human welfare. It delves into the philosophical arguments surrounding the detrimental effects of inequality, exploring how it threatens social harmony and individual well-being. Through this analysis, it sheds light on the broader consequences of disparities in wealth and status within communities.
Kaum ein Konzept im Werk Jean-Jacques Rousseaus trägt so großes Gewicht und ist so komplex angelegt wie das der »amour-propre« (Eigenliebe). Frederick Neuhouser hat die erste umfassende Studie zu diesem Begriff vorgelegt und enthüllt auf eindrucksvolle Weise dessen doppeltes Gesicht: Im Gegensatz zur »amour de soi« (Selbstliebe), die den Menschen im Naturzustand kennzeichnet, kommt die »amour-propre« erst im Gesellschaftszustand zum Vorschein. Sie ist der Quell von Neid, Eitelkeit und Konkurrenzdenken – des Bösen. Aber sie ist auch, wie Neuhouser zeigt, Motor des Kampfes um Anerkennung und somit Grundbedingung für die progressive Entfaltung von Vernunft, Freiheit und Moral – von Subjektivität überhaupt. Sie unterscheidet den Menschen vom Tier und ist deshalb auch Voraussetzung für Tugenden und Glück – das Gute. Ein Grundlagenwerk, nicht nur für Rousseau-Spezialisten.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau revolutionized our understanding of ourselves with his brilliant investigation of amour propre: the passion that drives humans to seek the esteem, approval, admiration, or love - the recognition - of their fellow beings. Frederick Neuhouser traces the development of this key idea in modern thought.
The author aims to explore the philosophical foundations of Hegel's social theory by examining the normative standards underpinning his assertion that the nuclear family, civil society, and constitutional state are rational or good. The central inquiry is what constitutes a rational social order according to Hegel. This work seeks to faithfully interpret Hegel's texts while articulating a compelling theory of rational social institutions, highlighting the richness of his vision for a rational social order. Frederick Neuhouser focuses on the conceptions of freedom that support Hegel's arguments for the modern social world, particularly emphasizing Hegel's significant yet often misunderstood idea of "social freedom." To clarify this concept, Neuhouser draws parallels with Rousseau's notion of the general will. Hegel adopts from Rousseau the idea that rational social institutions must meet two key criteria: they should provide the essential social conditions for the freedom of their members, and all members must be able to affirm these institutions as good, thereby recognizing the principles governing their social participation as originating from their own will.