Jouni-Matti Kuukkanen Bücher

Exploring the nuances of meaning change in scientific discourse, this work delves into Thomas Kuhn's influential theories, highlighting their philosophical, cognitive, and historical dimensions. The author critiques Hilary Putnam's causal theory of reference and connects Kuhn's insights to cognitive science, emphasizing their relevance to the evolution of ideas. The concluding analysis situates Kuhn's historical perspective within a coherentist epistemological framework, framing scientific progress as an empirical inquiry. This book is essential for those studying the history and philosophy of science, as well as anyone intrigued by scientific evolution.

Thomas Kuhn with his classic The Structure of Scientific Revolutions is one of the most influential and widely read philosophers of the 20th century. Kuhn's claim that the meanings of scientific terms change is often taken to be refuted by recent advances in the philosophy of language. Meaning Changes challenges this interpretation showing that meaning change in Kuhn has multiple aspects: Semantic, mental and historical. The author describes the traditional view with clarity, but demonstrates that Kuhn's idea stems from his studies of history. The book explains how Kuhn's philosophy is supported by cognitive science and why meaning change is relevant to the history of ideas. It argues that Kuhn's case against Hilary Putnam's causal theory of reference constitutes serious criticism of the account. The book concludes by analysing Kuhn's 'historical perspective' in the coherentist epistemological framework, which regards the question of scientific progress ultimately as empirical. This book will be of particular interest to students and scholars of the history and philosophy of science. It also is valuable reading to anybody interested in philosophy or scientific change.