Jean Tirole Bücher

The Theory of Industrial Organization is the first primary text to treat the new industrial organization at the advanced-undergraduate and graduate level

The past two decades have brought significant advancements in corporate finance, expanding its focus from merely financing corporations—equity, debt, and valuation—to encompass governance, liquidity, risk management, and the macroeconomic effects of corporations. However, this evolution has resulted in a confusing array of concepts and models that challenge students' understanding. A leading economist presents a clear, unified introduction to modern corporate finance theory, centered around a single model utilizing incentive or contract theory. This work fills a critical gap, serving as an essential resource for graduate and advanced undergraduate students, as well as researchers in corporate finance, industrial organization, political economy, development, and macroeconomics. The author outlines the fundamental principles that guide the analysis of contemporary management and public policy issues, including corporate governance reform, the roles of private equity and financial markets, and the effective management of leverage, dividends, liquidity, and risk. Empirical studies are integrated into the theoretical framework, and the corporation is examined within its broader microeconomic and macroeconomic contexts, highlighting the interaction between corporate environments and institutions. This text sets a new standard in the field and is poised to be a definitive resource for years to come.

This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory—including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, subgame perfection, repeated games, and games of incomplete information—in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. The analytic material is accompanied by many applications, examples, and exercises. The theory of noncooperative games studies the behavior of agents in any situation where each agent's optimal choice may depend on a forecast of the opponents' choices. "Noncooperative" refers to choices that are based on the participant's perceived selfinterest. Although game theory has been applied to many fields, Fudenberg and Tirole focus on the kinds of game theory that have been most useful in the study of economic problems. They also include some applications to political science. The fourteen chapters are grouped in parts that cover static games of complete information, dynamic games of complete information, static games of incomplete information, dynamic games of incomplete information, and advanced topics.