Strongly secure authenticated key exchange in the standard model

Autor*innen

• Zheng Yang

Parameter

• Informatik & Programmierung

Mehr zum Buch

Many crucial network applications depend on confidential channels established by authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols over public networks. As cyber technology advances, new attacks on cryptosystems emerge, prompting the development of AKE solutions that offer stronger security guarantees. This thesis focuses on practical constructions for AKE protocols that are provably secure in a robust sense without relying on random oracles. We introduce three efficient compilers that transform passively secure key exchange protocols into authenticated key exchange protocols, ensuring security even against active adversaries. These compilers facilitate the design of new AKE systems with enhanced security properties in a modular, less error-prone manner, while also relaxing assumptions on existing key exchange mechanisms that lack provable AKE security. The security of our compilers is demonstrated in a modified CK model, allowing the adversary to reveal long-term secret keys or state information. Additionally, we address the challenge of constructing eCK secure two-party AKE protocols without random oracles or NAXOS-like tricks. We present a generic construction based on well-known cryptographic primitives, followed by a concrete protocol that is the first eCK secure solution in the standard model. Our proposed schemes can be implemented more efficiently with secure devices than previous eCK secure protocols. Finally, we extend o

• Sprache: Englisch
• Erscheinungsdatum: 2013