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Annotation In this book, Michael Slote offers the first full-scale foundational account of virtue ethics to have appeared since the recent revival of interest in the topic. Slote advocates a particular form of such ethics for its intuitive and structural advantages over Kantianism, utilitarianism, and common-sense morality, and he argues that the problems of other views can be avoided and a contemporary plausible version of virtue ethics achieved only by abandoning specifically moral concepts for general aretaic notions like admirability and virtue. The book defends a distinctive, intuitive, and symmetric ethical principle according to which we should balance self-concern with concern for others, but it also concludes that there is, contrary to utilitarianism, no single basis for status as a virtue nor any simple relation between the virtues and human well-being
Buchkauf
From Morality to Virtue, Michael Slote
- Sprache
- Erscheinungsdatum
- 1995
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- (Paperback)
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- Titel
- From Morality to Virtue
- Sprache
- Englisch
- Autor*innen
- Michael Slote
- Erscheinungsdatum
- 1995
- Einband
- Paperback
- Seitenzahl
- 296
- ISBN10
- 0195093925
- ISBN13
- 9780195093926
- Reihe
- Schlagwörter
- Sachbücher, Sozialwissenschaften, Philosophie
- Bewertung
- 3 von 5 Sternen
- Beschreibung
- Annotation In this book, Michael Slote offers the first full-scale foundational account of virtue ethics to have appeared since the recent revival of interest in the topic. Slote advocates a particular form of such ethics for its intuitive and structural advantages over Kantianism, utilitarianism, and common-sense morality, and he argues that the problems of other views can be avoided and a contemporary plausible version of virtue ethics achieved only by abandoning specifically moral concepts for general aretaic notions like admirability and virtue. The book defends a distinctive, intuitive, and symmetric ethical principle according to which we should balance self-concern with concern for others, but it also concludes that there is, contrary to utilitarianism, no single basis for status as a virtue nor any simple relation between the virtues and human well-being